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A&M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC.:
A CASE COMMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Ask anyone with a computer and a quick Internet connection what
was the coolest thing about going on-line and more than likely the re-
sponse will be, "Free music on Napster!" But, the Napster case does not
just concern the simple notion of bootlegging music. Nor is it about con-
sumer justification since record companies are charging exorbitant fees
for a CD, when they can produce the same CD for pennies on the dollar.
More than a quick, easy, and free way to share music with fellow music
buffs using the innovations of Internet technology, the Napster contro-
versy is about the value of intellectual property ("IP") in today's new
world of Cyberspace. Beyond the notion of "fair use,"' this comment will
discuss how the Napster outcome should shape current copyright law to
deal with the exchange of information through peer-to-peer file sharing
on the World Wide Web.
Napster exploded onto the Internet. Since its founding in May
1999,2 Napster estimated that it would expand its network to reach be-
yond seventy million users by the end of 2000.' The creator of Napster,
Shawn Fanning, was a 20-year-old computer programming student at
Northeastern University when he decided to develop an easier way to
share music with his college roommate. From a small user base to one of
the most popular sites on the Internet in less than one year, this "brain-
child of a college student"5 has brought the court's attention to copyright
infringement at an exponential rate. The ultimate holding will be critical
toward defining boundaries for Internet services, and just how far the
notion of "fair use" can be stretched.6 Beyond whether or not one Internet
service is liable for the bootlegging of CDs among its user community,
this case presents the court with a new technology known as peer-to-peer
("P2P") file sharing, which can facilitate copyright infringement in a
matter of seconds between millions of different and anonymous users.
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
2. See http://www.napster.com/company (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
3. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (referring
to defendant's internal documents that suggest there will be seventy-five million Napster users by
the end of 2000).
4. See http://www.napster.com/company (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
5. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
7. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
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II. FACTS
A collection of eighteen powerful record and publishing companies
sued Napster, Inc. (hereinafter, "Napster"), an Internet company, for al-
leged contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.8 The plaintiff
companies brought suit on December 6, 1999 and moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent Napster from allowing its users to make copies
of copyrighted music without permission of the owners of the rights.9
The alleged copyright infringement was accomplished through the use of
MP3 files and Napster's MusicShare software, which could be down-
loaded for free from Napster's Internet site.'0 MP3 or MPEG3 stands for
Motion Picture Experts Group, level 3." MP3 files are capable of com-
pressing digital audio files to 1/12 of their original size without destroy-
ing the sound quality. 2 Once users had the software and were registered
on the Napster system, they were able to make their user directory con-
taining their own MP3 files available to other users while on-line, and
could perform searches for MP3 files on other user directories to make
copies for their own personal use. 3 The contents of the music files did
not reside on and never even passed through the Napster servers; only the
names of the files and users were stored and indexed. 4 Therefore, the
plaintiff record companies alleged that Napster users were the direct in-
fringers and Napster was contributorily and vicariously liable through
facilitation of the infringing behavior.'5
On July 26, 2000, the Northern District Court of California granted
the plaintiff record companies' motion for a preliminary injunction and
enjoined Napster "from engaging in, or facilitating others in copying,
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copy-
righted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either
8. Id. at 896-900 (listing plaintiffs as A&M Records, Inc., Geffen Records, Inc., Interscope
Records, Sony Music Entertainment Inc., MCA Records, Atlantic Recording Corporation, Island
Records, Inc.. Motown Record Company L.P., Capitol Records, Inc., La Face Records, BMG Music
d/b/a the RCA Records Label, Universal Records Inc., Elektra Entertainment Group Inc., Arista
Records, Inc., Sire Records Group Inc., Polygram Records, Inc., Virgin Records America Inc., and
Warner Bros. Records, Inc.).
9. Id. at 900.
10. See id. at 901; see also http://www.napster.com/download (providing a method to
download the software needed to trade MP3s) (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
11. See http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci212600,00.html (providing a
technical definition of "MP3") (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
12. See id.; see also Recording Indus. Ass'n. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180
F.3d 1002, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining MP3).
13. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 901-902.
14. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing how
the transfer or copy of an MP3 file is made from one user's computer to another, otherwise known as
"peer-to-peer").
15. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 911.
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federal or state law, without express permission of the right's owner."'6
Napster appealed.
7
On July 28, 2000, pending the appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel of
judges stayed the injunction. 8 But on appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with the district court that a preliminary injunction was
"not only warranted but required."' 9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
pealsfound that the Plaintiff record companies would likely succeed in
establishing that Napster was contributorily and vicariously liable for
copyright infringement.'
In district court, Napster asserted the affirmative defenses of fair use
and substantial non-infringing uses, as well as a First Amendment chal-
lenge, copyright misuse and waiver. 2' The lower court rejected all de-
fenses raised by Napster.2 Both sides presented expert witnesses and
moved to exclude certain expert reports and findings.2 ' The district court
denied all of Napster's motions to exclude the plaintiff record compa-
nies' reports because they were useful in showing irreparable injury. 4 In
addition, the court granted the plaintiff record companies' motions to
exclude or not rely on certain defense reports due to inadmissible conclu-
sions and dubious credibility. 5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the conclu-
sions made by the district court on the expert opinions and determined
the report rulings were not an abuse of discretion and were valid.2 The
court also revisited Napster's fair use defense and the new defenses it
raised under the Audio Home Recording Act and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. 27 Concluding that "having digital downloads available for
free on the Napster system necessarily harms the copyright holders' at-
tempts to charge for the same downloads," the court of appeals stated
that Napster has had a "deleterious effect on the present and future digital
download market." 29
Therefore, on February 12, 2001, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the Northern District Court of California's decision and ruled
16. See id. at 927.
17. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004.
18. Id. at 1011.
19. Id. at 1027.
20. See id at 1022-24.
21. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 912-25.
22. Id.
23. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C9905183MHP, 2000 WL 1170106 at *I (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
24. Napster, 2000 WL 1170106, at *7-8.
25. Id. at *8.
26. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2000).
27. Id. at 1014-26.
28. Id. at 1017.
29. Id.
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for a preliminary injunction, but reversed and remanded to the lower
court to clarify the scope of the original injunction because it was over-
broad.3" The district court modified the injunction on March 5, 2001 to:
(1) require notice by the record companies of copyrighted works they
wish removed from the Napster system; and (2) require Napster itself to
police the system, ensuring that copyrighted works of which it has re-
ceived notice are not copied, downloaded, uploaded, transmitted, or dis-
tributed.3' In the event the injunction was wrongfully issued, according to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 (c), the district court required the
plaintiffs to set bond for damages incurred in the amount of five million
dollars.32
III. BACKGROUND
Federal copyright law has roots in the Constitution, where exclusive
rights are granted to creators of original works to encourage "the prog-
ress of science and useful arts."'" Rather than an "inevitable, divine, or
natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their crea-
tions," copyright law is intended to "stimulate activity and progress.., for
the intellectual enrichment of the public." 34 In other words, copyright law
has a dual purpose; it protects the author of the original work and allows
for certain uses by others that provide societal benefits. The Copyright
Law of 1976 gives copyright owners a cause of action if someone in-
fringes on their original work. 5 Unfortunately, the 1976 Act was limited
in the area of copyright law as it pertains to the internet and especially
silent in its specific applicability to the peer-to-peer copying of digital
music files.36
In 1992, the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA") amended the
existing Copyright Act to allow the use of digital audio recording devices
to copy digital music recordings for personal, noncommercial use.3 7 This
statute arose as part of the legislature's attempt to keep up with technol-
ogy. s Nevertheless, it is evident that, at the time the AHRA was passed,
the legislators did not anticipate that home computers would be used as
audio recording and listening devices just a few years later. Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the AHRA does not
30. Id. at 1027-28.
31. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3-
7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
32. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Napster,
239 F.3d at 1011; FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
36. See id.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1992).
38. Kristine J. Hoffman, Comment, Fair Use or Fair Game? The Internet, MP3 and
Copyright Law, 11 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 153, 166 (2000).
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protect persons who copy MP3 files from a computer hard drive because
"computers are not digital audio recording devices" as defined by the
statute.39
In another attempt to update the existing copyright law with ad-
vancements in technology, Congress passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") in 1998.40 The DMCA provides Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") a safe harbor from copyright infringement
suits. 4' To qualify for the safe harbor, ISPs cannot initiate the transfer,
modify the illegal material, or keep a copy of the work. 2 If applicable,
the DMCA shields an ISP from any contributory copyright liability
where the users of the service are sharing illegal files.
A. Copyright Infringement
Generally, in order to be successful in establishing a claim for direct
copyright infringement, a plaintiff must satisfy the following require-
ments: (1) proof of ownership of the material in question, and (2) dem-
onstration of a violation of one of the exclusive rights of the copyright
holder.4 '3 Furthermore, in order to establish secondary copyright liability,
the secondary infringer must know or have reason to know of the direct
infringement, and induce, cause, or materially contribute to the infringing
behavior."
A recent case of contributory infringement on the Internet involving
Netcom, a popular ISP, determined that the requisite knowledge required
for secondary liability cannot be imputed to a system operator merely
through the defendant's conduct.45 Instead, contributory infringement
must be demonstrated through actual awareness of specific acts of in-
fringement.46 In Netcom, the ISP and the operator were accused of con-
tributory copyright infringement because they allowed the posting of
infringing material, taken from copyrighted works of L. Ron Hubbard,
on one of the bulletin boards by one of Netcom's many users.4 ' The court
refused to conclude that the ISP or the operator were liable simply be-
cause the structure of the system allowed for copyrighted material to be
39. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1002,
1078 (9th Cir. 1999).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998) (effective Oct. 28, 1998).
41. Id. § 512(a).
42. Id.
43. See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954
(1987).
44. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.Supp.
1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
45. Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1372-73.
46. Id. at 1374.
47. Id. at 1365-66.
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posted. 8 In addition, both Netcom and the operator lacked the requisite
knowledge that one of its users infringed upon the copyrighted work.49
Beyond direct and contributory copyright liability in copyright law,
a final way to impose fault is through vicarious liability. Vicarious copy-
right infringement occurs when a defendant "has the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in
such activities. ' Simply stated, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that there are two aspects of vicarious liability: financial benefit and
supervision.' Financial benefit can be shown through conclusive evi-
dence of a party's direct financial interest in activities "where infringing
performances enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential cus-
tomers."5 2 Furthermore, the right and ability to supervise can arise either
from an existing employer-employee relationship or in the absence of
any formal supervisory power, so long as the party is in a position to
police the behavior of the direct infringers."
The supervision aspect of vicarious liability is exemplified in the
Fonovisa case, which held auction operators vicariously liable for the
direct copyright infringement of booth operators.- The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that because the auction operators, whose goal
was to maximize profits, had the ability to block the access of copyright
infringers to the swap meet, and did nothing, they played a secondary
role in the infringement.5 In sum, any evidence of a direct financial in-
terest coupled with the ability to supervise the infringing behavior gives
rise to liability through vicarious copyright infringement.
B. Affirmative Defenses
One defense in copyright infringement cases is known as the fair
516use defense. It is an affirmative defense that, when raised, can bar a
defendant's direct copyright infringement liability by applying four fac-
tors and an "equitable rule of reason" to the specific facts of each indi-
vidual case.57 Furthermore, if someone is accused of direct copyright
infringement and is later found to be a fair user, then the logical conclu-
48. Id. at 1372-73.
49. Id. at 1374.
50. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
51. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259 at 262.
52. Id. at 263.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 261-64.
55. Id. at 263-65.
56. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984); 17
U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (2001).
57. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 (referring to H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976)).
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sion follows that there can be no basis for secondary infringement." The
fair use defense is derived from Section 17 U.S.C. § 107 and reads in
part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (in-
cluding multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.5 9
There are other ways to limit secondary liability beyond proving
that the use is a fair use. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
manufacturers of home video tape recorders, whose product is purchased
by the general public to copy television programs for private viewing,
did not infringe on copyright holders who had their works broadcast on
free television because it in effect expanded the viewing audience. 60 The
Sony court focused on the fair use activities of the consumer of the home
video tape recorder, and found that there were substantial non-infringing
activities, such as taping public domain material. 6' Because the U.S. Su-
preme Court applied an "equitable rule of reason" when weighing out all
the factors of a fair use analysis, they held that the manufacturers could
not be secondary infringers since the balance tipped in their favor.62
Thus, the Court reasoned the sale of the Betamax device did not amount
to secondary infringement because: (1) the intended use was for non-
commercial purposes, (2) the space-shifting entitled exposure of the
copyrighted material for private home use, and (3) substantial, non-
58. See generally Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. 417,454-56 (holding that Sony is not liable for
contributory copyright infringement because time-shifting is a fair use).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 107(l)-(4).
60. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 421, 443.
61. Id. at 424, 444 (emphasizing sports, religious, and educational programming); see also id.
at 433 (explaining that a copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to reproductions of
public domain material).
62. Id. at 454-55.
20011
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
infringing uses of the product or service existed, such as access to free
television programming.63
C. Recent Cases Involving Digital Music Files
In cases of copying digital music files on the Internet, the fair use
defense, when specifically applied to space- or time-shifting, has seen
both a success and a failure. In June 1999, the fair use defense was
stretched to include the distribution of MP3 files via a portable device.
6
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the space-shifting of copy-
righted music from a user's computer hard drive to the user's portable
MP3 player (the "Rio") is a noncommercial personal use, and therefore a
fair use.65 The court said that this did not involve distribution of the copy-
righted material to the general public, and was merely allowing an indi-
vidual user to make a copy of his own file to render it portable.6
On May 4, 2000, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York analyzed a similar case but rejected the fair use defense and held
that the reproduction of unauthorized copies of audio CDs into MP3 files
for space-shifting purposes on the website My.MP3.com did not signifi-
cantly transform the work.67 In its fair use analysis, the court pointed out
that even though My.MP3.com's use of the copyrighted works seemed to
have a positive impact on one market, the impact did not tip the scale
toward a finding of fair use where copyright infringement has occurred,
nor did it give an unauthorized user the right to enter into a valid copy-
right holder's future market."
IV. A&M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC. 69
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower
court's finding that the record company plaintiffs could successfully pre-
sent "a prima facie case of direct infringement" against Napster users.
7
0
In other words, since the court held that Napster users directly infringed
the copyrighted works, Napster could potentially be liable for contribu-
tory and/or vicarious copyright infringement. 7' The direct infringement
63. Id. at 442, 446.
64. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1002,
1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the Rio's function as being for personal use and consistent with the
Copyright Act's main purpose).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (considering the first factor of a
fair use analysis, "the purpose and character of the use," and whether the new use transforms the
work by infusing it with new meaning or new understanding).
68. See UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
69. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
70. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
71. See id. at 1019-20.
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claim achieved success through demonstration of ownership of the copy-
righted files and proof that Napster users violated the reproduction and
the distribution rights of the copyright owners." On appeal, Napster did
not dispute that direct infringement occurred through its users, but rather
asserted the affirmative defenses of fair use and substantial non-
infringing uses, as well as defenses under the Audio Home Recording
Act and the safe harbor of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and the
defenses of waiver, implied license, and copyright misuse.73 The court of
appeals rejected all of Napster's defenses.
A. Are Napster users 'fair users?"
If Napster is unable prove its users were fair users, then Napster
itself may be liable for contributory or vicarious copyright
infringement.75 In considering the preliminary injunction, the court of
appeals applied the four statutory factors of the fair use doctrine listed in
the Copyright Act of 1976 to determine that Napster users were not fair
76users.
The first factor in a fair use analysis, "the purpose and character of
the use, ' 77 focuses on how transformative the work is as related to the
original copyrighted work.78 The court of appeals held that the down-
loading of MP3 files is merely a transmission of the copyrighted work in
a different medium and, therefore, is not transformative.79 In addition, the
court of appeals looked at whether the uses had commercial or noncom-
mercial purposes.8° Because Napster users anonymously requested files
and, by copying the MP3 files, the users obtained music for free that they
otherwise would have had to buy, the court found that Napster users
qualified as commercial users.8'
The second factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work, ' 82 did not
require much analysis by the court of appeals, as musical compositions
83are generally considered creative in nature. Since creative works are
72. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("as
much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted, and more than
seventy percent may be owned or administered by plaintiffs"), affd in part, rev 'd in part, 239 F.3d
1004. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2000) (setting forth the exclusive rights of a copyright
owner).
73. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014, 1024-26.
74. See id. at 1019, 1024-26.
75. See idi at 1019-20.
76. See id. at 1014-19.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1999).
78. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
79. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
80. See id.
81. See id
82. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
83. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
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"closer to the core of intended copyright protection"" than other fact-
based works, the scale is tipped in the copyright owner's favor and
against a finding of fair use.85
The third factor of a fair use analysis, "the amount and substantiality
of the portion used,"86 rests on a qualitative and quantitative analysis. 7
No absolute rules govern the determination as to how much of a copy-
righted work may be copied and still qualify as a fair use. 8 The court of
appeals based its decision on Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia
Church of God, Inc.,s9 which held that "[w]hile 'wholesale copying does
not preclude fair use per se,' copying an entire work 'militates against a
finding of fair use.'''9 Therefore, because Napster users copied the entire
work, the court found strong, but not conclusive, evidence of infringing
behavior.9'
The Supreme Court has described the fourth factor, "the effect of
the use upon the potential market," ' as the "single most important ele-
ment of fair use."93 The court of appeals reviewed the expert reports pre-
sented by both parties and agreed with the district court that Napster had
a "deleterious effect on the present and future digital download
market.
, 94
Using all four factors in an "'equitable rule of reason' analysis,"95
the court held that Napster users were not fair users and that they directly
infringed on the exclusive rights of copyright owners.96
84. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,586 (1994)).
85. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
87. 'See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
88. See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986)
(affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment for defendant author because the verbatim
copying of published interviews amounted to only 4.3% of the words in the copyrighted work); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (holding that copying a
television program in its entirety, for the purpose of home time-shifting, is a fair use); Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985) (finding the use of an
insubstantial amount of quoted words from a manuscript to be infringement because the quoted
words were essentially the book's focal point).
89. 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000).
90. Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
91. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1999).
93. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
94. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1017.
95. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (stating the
four factors "enable a Court to apply an 'equitable rule of reason' analysis to particular claims of
infringement") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976)).
96. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014-17.
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B. Substantial Non-infringing Uses
Napster also attempted to show its system was capable of a substan-
tial number of non-infringing uses,97 which outweighed any of the poten-
tial infringing uses. 9 However, the court of appeals did not agree with
Napster that sampling, space-shifting, or permissive reproduction con-
stituted substantial non-infringing uses.' First, the court determined that
sampling is, in fact, a commercial use, and even if sampling boosted
compact disc sales, it was still unauthorized.' °° Next, the court of appeals
rejected the space-shifting defense because rather than exposing the
copyrighted material solely to the original user, Napster's method of
space-shifting made the material available to the general public.'0 ' Lastly,
the court said Napster could not assert permissive reproduction as a de-
fense because the plaintiff record companies had not challenged the
noninfringing uses of Napster, which included Napster's "New Artist
Program," message boards, and chat rooms, '°w as well as music down-
loads from copyright owners who consented to their music being avail-
able through Napster.
C. Audio Home Recording Actd o3
Napster asserted the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
("AHRA") as a defense to the charges of copyright infringement based
on secondary liability.'' The AHRA protects the manufacturers, import-
ers, and distributors of digital audio recording devices by allowing "in-
home noncommercial recording of copyrighted works.' 0 5 However, the
court of appeals rejected Napster's AHRA defense, concluding "the
Audio Home Recording Act does not cover the downloading of MP3
files to computer hard drives" because "computers ... are not digital
audio recording devices," as that term is defined in the AHRA.'16
97. See id. at 1017-19.
98. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 ("[Tlhe sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.").
99. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1018-19. Sampling occurs when a user downloads a music file to
consider whether to buy the recording. See id. at 1018. Space-shifting occurs when a user downloads
a music file from Napster that the user already possesses on an audio compact disc. See id. at 1019.
100. See id. at 1018-19.
101. See idL at 1019.
102. See id.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1999).
104. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
105. Kevin Davis, Comment, Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul, 34
U.S.F. L. REV. 129, 159 (1999).
106. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024 (quoting Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999)). The court also noted that the plaintiff
record companies did not assert claims under the AHRA. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
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D. Digital Millennium Copyright Act'°7
Napster also asserted a defense under the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act ("DMCA"), which, Napster argued, limited its liability as a
secondary infringer."°a Section (d) of the DMCA reads:
(d) Information location tools.--A service provider shall not be liable
for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for in-
junctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by
reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location
containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using infor-
mation location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer,
or hypertext link, if the service provider--
(1)(A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or ac-
tivity is infringing;
(B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is appar-
ent; or
(C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expedi-
tiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider
has the right and ability to control such activity; and
(3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of
this paragraph, the information described in subsection
(c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be identification of the reference or link, to
material or activity claimed to be infringing, that is to be re-
moved or access to which is to be disabled, and information rea-
sonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate that
reference or link."°
Based on its DMCA analysis, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's finding."0 The district court had rejected Napster's DMCA
defense and held that § 512(d) of the DMCA does not protect secondary
infringers."' The court of appeals disagreed with this blanket conclusion
made by the district court because it felt that circumstances might exist in
which the DMCA could protect a party from contributory and vicarious
107. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1999).
108. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
110. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
111. See A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
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liability."' Although the plaintiffs had shown that Napster would proba-
bly be unable to obtain protection under the safe harbor of the DMCA,
the court felt that questions raised by this defense, such as whether Nap-
ster qualifies as an ISP, would be better resolved at trial."3 Therefore, in
considering the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court determined
the DMCA defense was not strong enough to protect Napster.'"4 How-
ever, the court noted the DMCA defense may prove useful during trial. "'
E. Other Defenses
The court rejected Napster's defenses of waiver, implied license,
and copyright misuse. ' 16 First, the court noted that "[w]aiver is the inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence
and the intent to relinquish it.""' Napster asserted that the "plaintiffs
knowingly provided consumers with technology designed to copy and
distribute MP3 files over the Internet and, thus, waived any legal author-
ity to exercise exclusive control over creation and distribution of MP3
files."" 8 However, the court refused to hold the record companies re-
sponsible for creating the tools that enable the illegal reproduction of
music files." 9
Next, Napster claimed that the record companies granted Napster an
implied license to distribute MP3 files on the Internet. 2° Courts have
been reluctant to find implied licenses except where one party has cre-
ated a work by request and provided the work to the requestor, with the
intention that the requestor would copy and distribute the work.'2 ' Thus,
this defense succeeds in very few circumstances.' 2  Therefore, the court
felt that the existence of some online advertising that promoted permis-
sive downloads of specified music files did not equate to the record com-
panies granting to Napster an implied license that made countless copy-
righted works available for distribution.'
23
Finally, Napster claimed copyright misuse and alleged that online
distribution of music files "is not within the copyright monopoly.' 24 The
court rejected this defense simply because the rights to reproduce and




116. See id. at 1026-27.
117. Id. at 1026 (quoting United States v. King Features Entm't, Inc., 843 F.2d 394, 399 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
118. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1026.
119. See iL
120. See id.
121. See id (citing SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc.,
211 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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distribute a copyrighted work are the copyright owner's exclusive
rights.'2
In rejecting all of Napster's defenses, the court of appeals upheld
the preliminary injunction against Napster to stop its participation in
copyright infringement.'2 The court of appeals affinrned in part, and re-
versed in part, the lower court's decision. 27 The court then remanded the
case to the District Court for the Northern District of California to mod-
ify the scope of the injunction. 2 8 The court of appeals ordered modifica-
tion to limit Napster's burden of ensuring protection of all copyrighted
works on its system. 129 The court held that although Napster must still
police its system for infringing MP3 files, the plaintiff record companies
must supply Napster with notice of the copyrighted works they wish to
protect. "'
F. Damages
If the district court finds Napster liable for contributory and vicari-
ous copyright infringement, the question of damages naturally arises.
Napster may prove that it did not cause any actual monetary damage to
the record companies. In fact, by making an artist's songs available on
the Internet, Napster may have sparked listeners' interests in purchasing
the entire compact disc."' Thus, it is possible that Napster's shareware
music programs help sales, rather than hinder them.32 Furthermore, Nap-
ster never technically made money. 33 Napster was simply an extremely
popular site with potential to make future acquisitions or to be acquired
themselves.'3 Damages, however, can be considerable in copyright in-
fringement cases. For example, when a court found MP3.com guilty of
willful copyright infringement through its site, My.MP3.com, the court
assessed MP3.com with statutory damages of $53,400,000. 35 The Nap-
ster case will be the first in which a court will assess damages, if any, for
125. See id at 1026-27.
126. See id. at 1029.
127. See id.
128. See id., remanded to No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. 2001).
129. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027, 1029; Napster, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3-*9.
130. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027; Napster, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3-*7.
131. See Joel Selvin, Editorial, Did Napster Help Boost Record Sales?, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5,
2001, at 54, available at 2001 WL 3410699.
132. See id.
133. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (explaining that Napster does not
collect revenues and does not charge its users any fees), affid in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d
1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
134. See A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (measuring Napster's value partially by the
number of Napster users and concluding that Napster was worth between sixty and eighty million
dollars).
135. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0472 (JSR), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17907 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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contributory and vicarious copyright liability on the Internet for music
piracy. The district court will have to decide if it wants to send a message
to other current or potential pirate sites by imposing a large damages
award against Napster.
V. ANALYSIS
The aftermath of the injunction, in essence, disabled Napster and
forced its user community to turn elsewhere for pirated music.' 36 Today,
Napster must police itself for infringing users and files. 3 7 Consequently,
music fans, although still claiming devout loyalty to Napster, have turned
their attention temporarily to other piracy tools such as Gnutella, Mor-
phius, Aimster, Freenet, iMesh, and others. 38 These services have
tweaked the Napster idea to limit their central involvement and, for now,
decrease their liability.'39 In other words, while Napster takes the wrath of
the record companies, the infringing behavior has simply shifted to other
sites and systems that continue to do the forbidden file sharing; these
other systems just share files in a different manner.140
A court would likely absolve a peer-to-peer ("P2P") software dis-
tributor of any direct infringement liability since the distributor plays no
actual part in the infringing behavior. However, as the court of appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held in granting a preliminary injunction against
Napster, creators and operators of P2P systems can be liable for con-
tributory and vicarious copyright infringement.' l4 The court analyzed the
secondary infringement issue as follows: (1) a party can be liable for
contributory copyright infringement if it has knowledge of and materi-
ally contributes to another party's infringing activity, and (2) a party can
be liable for vicarious infringement if it receives financial benefit from
and controls another party's infringing activity.'42 Additionally, the court
found that once a party receives information regarding specific acts of
infringing behavior, the party must do something to prevent the
behavior.'
4 3
136. See Opinion, New Labels, Same Act, PALM BEACH POST, July 28, 2001, at 12A, available
at 2001 WL 24556444.
137. See Napster, No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *5-*6. (N.D. Cal.
2001).
138. See Opinion, supra note 136; Gnutella at http://www.gnutella.co.uk (last visited Oct. 21,
2001); Morphius at http://www.morphius.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2001); Aimster at
http://www.aimster.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2001); The Free Network Project at
http://frecnet.sourceforge.net (last visited Oct. 21, 2001); iMesh at http://www.imesh.com (last
visited Oct. 21, 2001).
139. See Lee Gomes, Entertainment Industry Sues to Curtail Web Music-Sharing System
Morpheus, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2001, at B9, available at Westlaw, 2001 WL-WSJ 2877494.
140. See id
141. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001),
remanded to 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186.
142. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019, 1022.
143. See id at 1021.
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However, a question arises regarding those systems with architec-
ture making it impossible to monitor, block, or otherwise prevent in-
fringing behavior." With the system at issue in the Napster case, Napster
could supervise its users and block certain users if it chose to do so, and
the court weighed this factor while considering the allegations of secon-
dary liability.' 45 The new and improved alternatives to Napster are true
P2P systems, and because of this distinction, may be able to escape li-
ability. ' 6 A true P2P system requires no central unit.'47 The transfer of
information occurs between two end users who work directly with one
another.' 48 Today, by employing one of the new technologies such as
Gnutella, a user simply logs on to the Internet and instantly begins
searching and sharing files directly with other Gnutella users. 149 The user
never has to communicate with a central server to facilitate the process."5
Regardless of the ability of file-sharing web sites to control users or
block the sharing of certain files, the court must consider those systems
that cannot police their users. Software, and particularly Internet soft-
ware, has the capability of undergoing rapid transformations to alter a
particular feature or change the system architecture. In light of this tech-
nology and in the interest of judicial economy, the Napster court should
consider adopting a broadly tailored decision to capture many of the cur-
rent and future P2P systems that are popular with copyright infringers,
rather than limiting its holding to systems with policing capabilities.
As discussed in detail above, the district court held that Napster
could not rely on the "Betamax" defense because Napster did not have
substantial non-infringing uses."'' The court of appeals, while recogniz-
ing the possibility that a P2P file sharing system could have a substantial
number of non-infringing uses, chose not rule on this issue during the
preliminary injunction phase.5 2 For example, a file sharing system not
promoting infringing activity still has the potential of facilitating unau-
thorized copying.'53 If a P2P system's main purpose is more generic than
the facilitation of music piracy, the system could potentially escape li-
ability under the court of appeals's holding. The court of appeals found
Sony and the defense of substantial non-infringing uses inapplicable
144. See Gomes, supra note 139.
145. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
146. See Gomes, supra note 139.
147. See Dave Wilby, Top of the Swaps (Six Music-Sharing Web Sites), INTERNET MAG., Sept.
1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27915442.
148. See id.
149. See Hane C. Lee, The Next Napster? Nowhere in Sight, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Feb. 19,
2001, available at 2001 WL 7800832; Gnutella at http://www.gnutella.co.uk (last visited Oct. 21,
2001).
150. See Lee, supra note 149.
151. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004.
152. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
153. See id. at 1020-21.
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since Napster had "both actual and constructive knowledge that its users
exchanged copyrighted music," and therefore could be liable for secon-
dary infringement based on knowledge alone.14
At this point, whether centralized or non-centralized P2P systems on
the Internet can escape liability by raising the "Betamax" defense for
substantial non-infringing uses remains unclear. However, an important
distinction must be drawn between a video recorder that allows a person
to make a single, in-home copy of a broadcast television program and a
software tool that makes available, to thousands of anonymous computer
users, a free copy of a copyrighted work that is sold in the market. For
example, if Sony Corporation created a VCR with the primary purpose of
allowing people to first copy pay-per-view television shows and then
simultaneously make the shows available to thousands of anonymous
viewers via cable, the Sony court may have come to a different conclu-
sion on secondary liability.'55 In fact, the Sony court specified that video
recorders expanded "public access to freely broadcast television pro-
grams.' 56 Still, some people argue that the "Betamax" defense should be
broadly interpreted to hold that "the sale or distribution of a device that
enables others to engage in copyright infringement should not, on its
own, constitute a 'material contribution' to that infringement."'
57
Unfortunately, one cannot assume the holding in Napster governs
systems without policing capabilities, nor can one assume the holding
controls over systems with substantial non-infringing uses. Because the
court of appeals has ruled, and the district court on remand will have to
rule, based on the facts of the Napster case, the holding may be too nar-
row to apply to potential infringers using other similar systems. How-
ever, are these other non-centralized systems with substantial non-
infringing uses really a threat to copyright holders?
Although non-centralized P2P systems may currently escape liabil-
ity, the fact remains that unless a service has a centralized repository for
users to access, the service will not be as widely accessible or as widely
embraced as Napster. Napster is a safe, simple tool that was easy for
music fans to use.55 Napster feels easy and secure because it gives the
individual users control over which directories and MP3 files they want
to share. 59 Many of the other P2P systems, such as Gnutella, require us-
ers to be more technologically savvy than Napster users, and to under-
154. Id. at 1020.
155. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)
(discussing failure to show nonminimal harm to market).
156. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.
157. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 827 (2001).
158. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901-02 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004.
159. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-12.
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stand concepts such as firewalls and file server systems.' 6 These other
P2P systems may be slower, more complex, and have many bugs that
need to be worked out, including how much of one's system is exposed
to other anonymous Internet users.' 6' Despite the potential loopholes, the
Napster holding indicates it is wrong to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works on the Internet. Internet users will hopefully be more
apt to enroll in monthly fee sites in order to share copyrighted music and
movies on the Internet rather than risk revealing their personal computer
files and information to unknown people.
With its Napster decision, whichever court ends up with the "final
say" will become a pioneer in shaping the future of Internet copyright
law. Given the tremendous advancements in technology today and in
preparation for the advancements of tomorrow, the Napster opinion most
likely will not provide a complete solution for controlling copyright in-
fringement on the Internet. Regardless, by holding that A&M Records
"substantially and primarily prevailed on appeal," the court put develop-
ers and users of P2P systems on notice that liability for copyright in-
fringement on the Internet is real and violators will be prosecuted.
62
Without this critical starting point in policing copyrights on the Internet,
the unlimited reign of file sharing would have continued without set
boundaries on what kind of files users could copy for free, which affects
even the latest craze of DVD swapping.
The Supreme Court said, "[s]ound policy, as well as history, sup-
ports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological
innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.' 63 Because the
Napster holding will not altogether eliminate copyright infringement on
the Internet, the legislature must devise an amendment to the Copyright
Act. The amendment should hold the creators and distributors of P2P
programs liable if they facilitate mainstream distribution of software with
infringing capabilities, and have the knowledge and intent that a major
function of the program is to share copyrighted material without the con-
sent of the copyyright owner. A P2P system really cannot become main-
stream without a central website, knowledge base, or team of developers
that distribute new versions to the user community. Consequently, copy-
right owners will not face an impossible task when tracking down the
individuals responsible for facilitating the mainstream illegal activity.
160. See generally Gnutella, at http://www.gnutellanews.cominformation/what-is-gnutella.
shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (providing information on how Gnutella works);
http://gnutellanews.com/information/ firewalls.shtml (last modified May 21, 2000) (providing
information on how to establish a connection across a firewall).
161. See, e.g., Mia Garlick, The Ups and Downs of the Napster Revolution, at
http://www.gtlaw.com.au/templates/publications/default.jsp?pubid=42 (Dec. 9, 2000) (explaining
that Gnutella users must know a Gnutella server's numeric Internet protocol address to use the
program since Gnutella servers change several times daily).
162. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1029.
163. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
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Although the Recording Industry Association of America would
probably like to ban altogether the use of MP3 files except where copy-
right owners retain exclusive control of the reproduction and distribution
of the works, a better solution is to find a balance between technology
and copyright law.' 64 Currently, as the lawmakers focus on expanding
existing copyright law to allow greater protection to copyright owners on
the Internet, record companies and other members of the music industry
are joining forces to improve security measures.' 65 The Secure Digital
Music Initiative ("SDMI") is one step the music industry has taken to
improve security.'" In particular, the SDMI is preparing to release its
"black box" technology, which will "work in conjunction with 'water-
marks' to help filter out pirated music. ' 67 In essence, the SDMI water-
marking technology distorts the sound of a particular song if a pirate
attempts to copy the watermarked song.'6" Even though this "black box"
technology seems like a simple solution for preventing future digital mu-
sic piracy, the technology still has glitches that developers will have to
eliminate. Also, watermarking technology does not solve the existing
piracy problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technology is advancing at a rapid speed. Internet users have the
ability to transfer information all over the world with the click of a single
button. In a matter of seconds, data within one file is broken up into
pieces and transmitted over cable or phone lines to be rapidly reassem-
bled into a copy of the original file. Even more astounding is the fact that
these data transfers can be done anonymously between two personal
computers without leaving a trace behind. While legislators try to shape
the laws to keep up with new technology, such amendments become out-
dated before the lawmakers etch them on paper. While huge record com-
panies spend millions of dollars on lawsuits to recoup the pennies they
lose each time a song is shared among a community of music fans, a new
Internet service or device is developed to take the place of the previous
one.
The Napster case is an indication that history is repeating itself.
With the advent of radio in the 1930s, entertainers perceived radio as a
threat to their earnings through live performance. 69 Only gradually did
164. The Recording Industry Association of America is one of the biggest opponents of
Napster and other similar systems on the Internet. See Napster Lawsuit Q&A at
http://www.riaa.com/Napster.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2001).
165. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 38, at 179 (explaining that the Secure Digital Music
Initiative is an industry security initiative).
166. See id
167. Id. at 171.
168. See id
169. See Robert A. Gorman, The Recording Musician and Union Power: A Case Study of the
American Federation of Musicians, 37 Sw. L.J. 697, 702 (1983).
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entertainers fully appreciate the lucrative effect radio could have on their
music sales through mass communication. Today, many entertainers and
record companies view the Internet as a threat to compact disc sales.
However, like the tremendously positive effect radio had on performers'
popularity and potential earnings, the Internet possesses the same possi-
bilities, if used appropriately and within the guidelines of the law. Un-
doubtedly, Napster and other P2P systems provide a novel and innova-
tive means of sharing information. On the other hand, despite the poten-
tial of P2P systems becoming a lucrative new avenue to promote artists
and their music, copyright owners have every right to prevent the distri-
bution of unauthorized copies of their work to millions of Internet users
without their consent.
Jennifer Gokenbach
